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Implications of the  
Lisbon Treaty on EU 
External Trade Policy 
 
Synopsis    
This  background  paper  examines  the  changes 
introduced  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  (which  entered 
into  force  in  December  2009)  to  the  European 
Union Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and the 
likely implications for the EU’s trading partners.  It 
begins  with  an  overview  of  the  major  changes 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s 
external action and then elaborates more on the 
specific  changes  in  the  area  of  CCP.  The  paper 
further  puts  forward  some  possible  implications 
that  these  changes  may  have  for  EU’s  external 
trade relations with third countries.  | Page 2 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LISBON TREATY ON THE EUROPEAN UNION 
EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY (COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY) 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
  
The Lisbon Treaty that was signed and ratified 
by all EU member states (MS) came into force 
on 1 December 2009.  The Treaty is intended to 
make the EU more efficient, more democratic 
internally  and  more  coherent  on  the  world 
stage.  It introduces a number of changes to 
the  institutional  structure  and  functioning 
which  would  also  have  an  impact  on  EU 
policies.   
 
The  EU  now  has  a  single  legal  personality, 
which enables the EU as a whole to negotiate 
and sign in its name international treaties and 
agreements. To enhance the visibility of the EU 
and streamline the external representation of 
the EU, two new positions have been created: 
the  Permanent  President  of  the  European 
Council  and  a  High  Representative  for  the 
Union’s  Foreign  and  Security  Affairs.    Their 
work will be supported by a new agency, the 
European External Action Service.   
 
Of  particular  relevance  to  the  EU  trading 
partners such as Singapore are changes aimed 
at  making  the  EU  trade  policy  more 
comprehensive  and  more  democratic.  More 
generally,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  also  seeks  to 
achieve  greater  consistency  between  the 
different elements of the EU’s external action. 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  introduces  three  main 
changes to its external trade policy or what is 
usually Common Commercial Policy (CCP) in EU 
terminology: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU trade policy has now to be seen as 
an  integral  part  of  overall  EU  external 
action  and  its  relations  with  third 
countries  
 
One of the main objectives of the Lisbon Treaty 
is to increase the coherence and the efficiency 
of the European Union’s external action. 
  
The Lisbon Treaty brings the current external 
Community  policies  together  in  a  more 
comprehensive  manner.  All  elements  of  the 
EU’s  external  action  -  from  the  Common 
Foreign and Security Policy to trade policy for 
example - are from now on submitted to the 
same principles and objectives. These include 
inter  alia  human  rights,  good  governance, 
environmental  protection  and  sustainable 
development.  
 
This implies that the EU in formulating its trade 
policy  not  only  considers  the  economic 
liberalization  agenda,  but  has  to  take  into 
account  other  objectives.  The  Treaty  may 
therefore  provide  a  basis  for  the  use  of 
conditionality in trade policy, and lead to the 
“politicization” of trade policy, something that 
may not be welcomed by EU’s trading partners.   
 
How the current Trade Commissioner, Karel De 
Gucht  interacts  with  Catherine  Ashton,  the 
newly  appointed  High  Representative  of  the 
Union  for  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  whose 
task  is to  ensure  the  consistency  of the  EU’s 
external  action,  could  also  be  an  issue  of 
interest but may not necessarily have a huge 
impact  on  the  overall  conduct  of  trade 
relations with third countries.  
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The  European  Parliament  (EP)  is  given 
more powers in trade policy  
 
To  increase  the  democratic  accountability  of 
the  EU  trade  policy,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  gives 
more  power  to  the  EP  in  scrutinizing  trade 
policy. Before Lisbon, the EP only had a limited 
role  in  the  negotiations  and  conclusions  of 
trade agreements and in the adoption of trade 
legislation.  After Lisbon, the EU legislation for 
implementing  trade  policies  will  now  be  co-
decided by the Council and the EP. 
 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  to  report 
regularly to the Special Committee of the EP on 
the progress of trade negotiations, and more 
importantly,  the  EP  must  now  give  consent 
before a trade agreement can be adopted. This 
means  that  the  opinion  of  the  EP  becomes 
essential and this even before the initiation of 
any future trade negotiations if one wants to 
avoid  the  risk  of  having  the  entirety  of  the 
agreement  blocked  by  the  EP.  However,  it  is 
important to point out that the Lisbon Treaty 
does not grant the EP powers to authorize the 
EU to engage in trade negotiations. This power 
still belongs exclusively to the Council. 
 
The enhanced role of the EP will also increase 
the  possibility  of  having  non-economic 
objectives  such  as  human  rights  and  social 
standards issues being included in future trade 
agreements. The increased role given to the EP 
in the EU trade policy may therefore contribute 
to  increased  politicization  of  future  trade 
negotiations  leading  to  uncertainties  and 
possible  delays  in  getting  a  trade  agreement 
through. 
 
The system of allocation of competences 
in the area of EU trade policy is clarified 
 
Before  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  the  allocation  of 
competences  between  the  European 
Community and the Member States (MS) was 
complex and difficult to comprehend. Trade in 
goods was an exclusive European competence. 
Some  services  and  some  trade  related 
intellectual  property  rights  fell  under  the 
European competence while some others fell 
under the shared competences of the EU and 
the MS. Foreign Direct Investment was also an 
area of mixed competence, giving the MS the 
freedom  therefore  to  negotiate  its  own 
bilateral investment treaty (BITs) outside trade 
agreements. 
 
With  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  trade  in  goods  and 
services,  commercial  aspects  of  intellectual 
property  and  foreign  direct  investment  will 
now all fall under the exclusive competence of 
the European Union. Member states (MS) will 
no longer be able to conclude its own bilateral 
investment  treaties  (BIT)  unless  they  are 
empowered by the EU to do so. This also raises 
concern as to what would happen to existing 
BITs that MS concluded with its third countries. 
The  Treaty  notes  that  MS  will  be  obliged  to 
adapt their BITs to EU law. How this would be 
done is however not clearly spelt out, and in 
the  short  term  a  “grandfathering  solution”  is 
likely  to  be  adopted.    This  means  that  an 
exemption  might  be  granted  allowing  the 
existing  BITs  to  be  kept  in  place  until  the 
adoption of EU investment agreements.  
 
All these changes to bring trade in goods and 
services  and  FDI  under  the  exclusive 
competence  of  the  EU  are  expected  to 
contribute to a streamlining of the trade policy. 
The  need  for  further  mixed  agreements  will 
reduce  significantly.  Future  trade  agreements 
concluded  by  the  EU  are  likely  to  be 
comprehensive economic agreements covering 
all aspects of trade and investments. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The extent of the impact of reforms introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s external trade 
relations is still not entirely clear as the Treaty 
just came into force in December 2009. What is 
important  to  note  is  that  the  EU’s  trading | Page 4 
partners will have to look more broadly to the 
EU’s  trade  policy  as  an  integral  part  of  its 
overall external action globally. This may mean 
that non-trade policy issues may gain traction 
and  impact  specific  trade  agenda  and 
negotiations.  Secondly,  the  EU’s  trading 
partners will have to watch more closely the 
European  Parliament  (EP)  when  dealing  with 
the EU on trade issues. It is no longer enough 
just to lobby the key players in the Commission 
and  the  Council.  The  key  players  in  the 
International Trade Committee of the EP, and 
the political leanings and mood of the EP will 
have  an  impact  on  the  negotiations  and 
conclusions of any trade agreement. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE LISBON TREATY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
EXTERNAL TRADE POLICY (COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY) 
 
Written by Anne Pollet-Fort, Associate Fellow, EU Centre (with inputs from Arturs Alksnis, Research 
Associate, EU Centre)  
Edited by Yeo Lay Hwee, Director, EU Centre in Singapore 
 
Introduction  
 
On  1  December  2009,  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon 
entered into force. This Treaty actually refers 
to  the  Treaty  amending  the  Treaty  of  the 
European Union (1992, commonly referred to 
as  the  Maastricht  Treaty)  and  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Community  (1957, 
commonly referred to as Treaty of Rome). The 
latter is renamed the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU).  
 
The aims of the Lisbon Treaty is to  make the 
European  Union  (EU)  more  efficient,  more 
democratic  internally  and  more  coherent  on 
the  world  stage.  It  introduces  a  number  of 
changes  to  modernize  EU  institutions  and 
optimize working methods in the EU.  Some of 
the most significant changes are in the area of 
external  relations  and  the  external 
representation of the EU. 
 
Of  particular  relevance  to  the  EU  trading 
partners  is  the  EU  external  trade  policy  or 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP). This policy 
is  the  main  instrument  governing  EU  trade 
relations with non-EU countries and is used by 
the  EU  to  shape  its  interests  in  the  external 
economic sphere. Consistent with the general 
aims  of  the  EU  reform,  the  Lisbon  Treaty 
contains  novelties  aiming  at  making  the  CCP 
more  efficient,  more  democratic  and  at 
achieving  greater  consistency  between  the 
different policies of the EU’s external relations.   
 
This paper will first give a very broad overview 
of the main provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that 
impact the EU’s external action, and then zoom 
in to focus on the three key changes in the EU’s 
Common Commercial Policy that might have  
implications  for  EU  relations  with  its  trading 
partners.   
 
Main  Provisions  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  in 
the area of EU’s External Action 
 
The Lisbon Treaty groups together the multiple 
aspects of the EU’s foreign policy and external  
relations  under  the  new  heading  of  “Union’s 
External Action”. External Action includes the 
policy areas covered by Title V of the Treaty of 
the European Union (TEU), and Part V of the 
Treaty  of  the  Functioning  of  the  European 
Union  (TFEU),  namely  Common  Foreign  and 
Security  Policy,  Common  Commercial  Policy, 
economic, financial and technical co-operation 
with third countries, humanitarian aid, and the 
external  aspects  of  its  other  policies.  It  is 
explicitly  stated  that  “the  Union  shall  ensure 
consistency between the different areas of its 
external  action  and  between  these  and  its 
other policies” (Article 1(3) TEU). 
 
Although  the  Lisbon  Treaty  abolishes  the  old 
three  pillar  structure  (European  Community, 
Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  and 
Justice and Home Affairs), Article 24 TEU states 
that “the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP)  is  subject  to  specific  rules  and 
procedures.” The decision-making structure in 
CFSP  remains  essentially  intergovernmental 
and  unanimity  among  the  Member  States  is 
required for most policies.  
 
Broadly, the key changes that Lisbon Treaty has 
brought to the external action of the EU are: 
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1)  A single legal personality 
 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  replaced  the  European 
Community pillar by the European Union which 
“shall have legal personality” (Article 47 TEU). 
Henceforth, the EU will have a defined status in 
international law.  In other words, the EU will 
be able to negotiate and conclude international 
agreements in its name and represent itself in 
international  forums  and  organisations.    This 
should  also  in  principle  simplify  the  EU’s 
representation  in  international  organisations 
such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World  Bank,  and  others.  However,  it  is  clear 
that Member States will not always be willing 
to  cede  their  voting  rights  and  to  be 
represented collectively by the EU. Therefore, 
the  reality  is  that  the  EU  in  the  foreseeable 
future  will  continue  to  have  fragmented 
representation in the various key international 
bodies. 
 
2)  New positions and representations 
 
The Lisbon Treaty created two new positions, 
the  permanent  President  of  the  European 
Council  and  a  High  Representative  for  the 
Union’s Foreign and Security affairs (HR). The 
latter  combines the roles  of the  former  High 
Representative  of  the  Common  Foreign  and 
Security  Policy  (CFSP)  and  the  Commissioner 
for External Relations.  
 
According to the Treaty, the President of the 
European  Council  (Herman  van  Rompuy  has 
been elected as the first) chairs it and drives 
forward its work. He ensures the preparation 
and  continuity  of  the  work  of  the  European 
Council  in  cooperation  with  the  President  of 
the  Commission;  “endeavours  to  facilitate 
cohesion  and  consensus  within the  European 
Council  and  reports  to  the  European 
Parliament after each of the meetings of the 
European  Council”.
1   The  President  will  also 
share with the HR in representing the Union. 
                                                      
1  http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs 
/pressdata/en/ec/111298.pdf 
 
As for the HR, Baroness Catherine Ashton, she 
is expected to exercise, in foreign affairs, the 
functions which so far were exercised by the 
six-monthly rotating presidency, the HR of the 
CFSP  and  the  Commissioner  for  External 
Relations.  More specifically, she “conducts the 
Union’s  common  foreign  and  security  policy; 
presides  over  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council; 
ensures the consistency of the Union’s external 
actions;  represents  the  Union  for  matters 
relating  to  the  common  and  foreign  security 
policy,  conducts  political  dialogue  with  third 
parties on the Union’s behalf and expresses the 
Union’s position in international organisations 
and conferences; and exercises authority over 
the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS) 
and  over  the  Union’s  delegations  in  third 
countries and at international organisations”.
2 
 
More precisely, internally, Baroness Ashton will 
have  to  coordinate  all  aspects  of  the  EU’s 
external actions and have to work closely with 
Commissioners responsible for key policy areas 
such  as  trade,  development,  climate  action, 
humanitarian assistance and any other policies 
with an external dimension.  Externally, she will 
represent  the  EU,  and  be  the  “face”  and 
“voice” of the EU.  However, in reality, she will 
still have to contend with the foreign ministers 
of MS and compete for international attention. 
Much of how this will pan out will depend on 
Ashton’s handling of her  relations with the EU 
leaders, and finding a modus vivendi with the 
President of the European Council, Herman van 
Rompuy.  In short, the coherence of the EU’s 
external  representation  remains  unclear  and 
will  depend  on  how  well  Ashton  can  carve  a 
role for herself.  
 
3)  External Action Service 
 
The  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS), 
which has yet to be established, will give the 
                                                      
2  http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs 
/pressdata/en/ec/111298.pdf 
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High  Representative  the  necessary  assistance 
in delivering the EU’s external policies. It will 
be working “in cooperation with the diplomatic 
services  of  the  Member  States”  and  will 
comprise “officials from relevant departments 
of the General Secretariat of the Council and of 
the Commission as well as staff seconded from 
national  diplomatic  services  of  the  Member 
States.” (Article 27 (3) TEU) 
 
The  Swedish  Presidency  report  on  the  EEAS 
states  that  “to  ensure  the  consistency  and 
better  coordination  of  the  Union’s  external 
action,  the  EEAS  should  also  assist  the 
President  of  the  European  Council  and  the 
President  as  well  as  the  Members  of  the 
Commission in their respective functions in the 
area  of  external  relations  as  well  as  closely 
cooperate  with  the  Member  States.”  This 
shows that the EEAS will have a central role in 
the  efforts  to  enhance  the  coherence  of  the 
EU’s  external  relations.  It  will  consist  of 
geographical  and  thematic  desks.  The  report 
advises that trade and the development policy 
“should  remain  the  responsibility  of  relevant 
Commissioners  and  DGs  of  the  Commission.” 
The  report  says  that  the  geographical  desks 
“should  play  a  leading  role  in  the  strategic 
decision-making.” 
3 
 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  significantly  enhances  the 
status  of  the  Delegations  of  the  EU,  which 
previously  were  the  delegations  of  the 
European  Commission.  The  Lisbon  Treaty 
states  that  “the  diplomatic  missions  of  the 
Member  States  and the  Union delegations  in 
third  countries  and  at  international 
organisations  shall  cooperate  and  shall 
contribute  to  formulating  and  implementing 
the common approach” (Article 32 TEU). The 
Presidency  report  says  that  “Delegations  will 
contain  both  regular  EEAS  staff  (including 
                                                      
3 Presidency  report  to  the  European  Council  on  the 
European  External  Action  Service.  Council  of  the 
European  Union,  14930/09,  23  October  2009, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/st1
4930.en09.pdf 
Heads  of  Delegation)  and  staff  from  relevant 
Commission services” and that “all staff should 
work  under  the  authority  of  the  Head  of 
Delegation.” It is up to the High Representative 
to “establish a road map and timeframe for the 
upgrading of EU delegations.” 
4 
 
Currently,  there  are  more  questions  than 
answers  about  the  practical  arrangements 
regarding  the  EEAS.  Baroness  Ashton  has 
indicated that the EEAS should be independent 
of  other  EU  institutions;  only  its  budget  will 
form part of the general EU budget and will be 
controlled  by  the  European  Parliament. 
Baroness Ashton is still working on a legislative 
proposal, which would set out the functioning 
of the EEAS, its budget, areas of competence 
and  recruitment  procedure.  After  the 
consultations  with  the  European  Parliament, 
the  proposal  will  have  to  be  adopted  by  the 
European Council by the end of April 2010. 
 
4)  Role of the European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament will play an increased 
role  in  the  EU’s  external  action,  since  the 
President  of  the  European  Council  “shall 
present  a  report  to  the  European  Parliament 
after  each  of  the  meetings  of  the  European 
Council”  (Article  15  (6)  TEU).  The  High 
Representative  will  also  have  to  “regularly 
consult”  the  European  Parliament  about  the 
“main aspects and the basic choices”, as well as 
“ensure  that  the  views  of  the  European 
Parliament are duly taken into consideration” 
(Article  36  TEU).  The  Lisbon Treaty  stipulates 
that  twice  a  year  the  European  Parliament 
“shall  hold  a  debate  on  progress  in 
implementing  the  common  foreign  and 
security policy, including the common security 
and defence policy” (Article 36 TEU). 
 
5)  Normative Dimension of EU’s external 
action 
 
                                                      
4 Ibid. | Page 8 
The Lisbon Treaty also adds to the normative 
dimension to the EU’s external action. It states 
that “in its relations with the wider world, the 
Union shall uphold and promote its values (…) 
it  shall  contribute  to  peace,  security,  the 
sustainable  development  of  the  Earth; 
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, 
free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and 
the  protection  of  human  rights,  in  particular 
the rights of the child, as well as to the strict 
observance  and  the  development  of 
international  law,  including  respect  for  the 
principles  of  the  United  Nations  Charter” 
(Article  3  (5)  TEU).  Furthermore,  the  Lisbon 
Treaty states that the EU’s external action shall 
be  guided  by  the  following  principles: 
“democracy,  the  rule  of  law,  the  universality 
and  indivisibility  of  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms,  respect  for  human 
dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, 
and  respect  for  the  principles  of  the  United 
Nations Charter and international law.” (Article 
21 (1) TEU)  
 
This  normative  dimension  of  EU  external 
relations has always been expounded by some 
scholars  and  policy  makers  and  has  been 
included  in  the  former  treaties.  However,  by 
“enshrining”  them  in  EU’s  treaty  which  gives 
the Eu a legal personality, this brings a “legal 
dimension” which theoretically can open up EU 
external  actions  that  are  seen  as  “not  in 
conformity  to  the  guiding  principles  in  the 
Lisbon Treaty” to legal challenges.   
 
Changes  in  the  Common  Commercial 
Policy (CCP) 
 
All  the  above  provisions  in  the  EU’s  external 
action  made  it  necessary  also  for  the  EU  to 
reform  the  way  the  CCP  is  shaped  and 
operated.    To  improve  coherence  and 
effectiveness  and  to  address  the  issue  of 
democratic  deficit,  the  Lisbon  Treaty 
introduces  three  main  changes  to  the  CCP. 
These are: 
 
1.  The  CCP  has  now  to  be  operated  in  the 
broader context of the EU external action; 
2.  The  role  of  the  EP  in  the  shaping  and 
conduct of the CCP has been enhanced in 
several ways; 
3.  The system of competences in the area of 
the CCP has been clarified and simplified.  
 
1)  The EU trade policy as integral part of 
the broader context of EU external 
relations 
 
One  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  reform 
process that led to the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty was to increase the coherence and the 
efficiency  of  the  European  Union’s  external 
action to enable it to address the challenges of 
globalization  and  growing  interdependence.  
Therefore as mentioned in the introduction, a 
number of changes have been introduced with 
a  view  to  reduce  the  number  of  voices 
speaking on behalf of the Union and to ensure 
the consistency between the different areas of 
the EU’s external action. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty brings the current external 
Community  policies  together  in  a  more 
comprehensive  manner.  It  sets  out  common 
principles  and  objectives  for  the  Union’s 
external  action  and  most  of  the  external 
relations provisions of the existing treaties are 
now regrouped in a single Title.  
 
This is a significant change from the pre-Lisbon 
situation  where  Title  V  TEU  dealt  with  the 
common foreign and security policy, whereas 
the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community (ECT) (Treaty of Rome) had Title IX 
Common  commercial  policy,  Title  XX 
Development cooperation, Title XXI Economic, 
financial and technical cooperation with third 
countries, international agreements, restrictive 
measures,  international  relations  and 
instruments  among  the  general  and  final 
provisions (Part Six). 
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All elements of the EU’s external action from 
the  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  to 
cooperation  with  third  countries  and 
humanitarian  aid,  the  relations  with 
international  organisations  and  the  Common 
Commercial Policy are moreover submitted to 
the same principles and objectives as laid down 
in  Article  3  TEU  and  Article  21  TEU.  They 
include  inter  alia  human  rights,  good 
governance,  environmental  protection  and 
sustainable development.  
 
Even  if  Article  206  TFEU  then  defines  the 
specific objective of the Common Commercial 
Policy – to contribute, in the common interest, 
to the harmonious development of world trade, 
the  progressive  abolition  of  restrictions  on 
international  trade  and  on  foreign  direct 
investment, and the lowering of customs and 
other barriers- Article 207 (1) TFEU recalls that 
these cannot be seen in isolation and stresses 
that the Common Commercial Policy is to be 
conducted  within  the  context  of  the 
frameworks  and  principles  and  objectives  of 
the Union’s external action as defined in Article 
21 TEU.  
 
The Lisbon treaty also foresees a new system 
for the conduct of the external action of the 
European  Union.  In  particular,  it  creates  the 
two new positions of European President and 
of High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
and  Security  Policy  (hereafter  High 
Representative).  The  latter  is  to  play  an 
essential  role  in  the  coordination  of  the  EU 
external action. 
 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  makes  it  clear  that  the 
Commission  will  continue  to  negotiate  trade 
agreements with third countries.  At the same 
time,  the  High  Representative  of  the  Union 
Foreign and Security Policy has been entrusted 
with  task  of  ensuring  the  consistency  of  the 
Union's external action. In particular, Article 18 
TEU  states  that  “he  [sic]  shall  be  responsible 
within  the  Commission  for  responsibilities 
incumbent  on  it  in  external  relations  and  for 
coordinating  other  aspects  of  the  Union's 
external action.” This would imply in principle 
some need for coordination between the Trade 
Commissioner and the High Representative to 
ensure consistency of actions. 
 
2)  An increased role for the European 
Parliament  
 
Another  major  change  is  the  increased  role 
given  to  the  European  Parliament  in  the 
shaping  and  conduct  of  the  CCP.  This 
constitutes  a  significant  change  from  the 
previous CCP set-up. 
 
The  limited  role  of  the  European 
Parliament in the past 
 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the  European  Parliament  only  enjoyed  a 
limited role in the autonomous as well as in the 
conventional Common Commercial Policy.  
 
The  European  Parliament  had  a  very  limited 
role in the negotiation and conclusion of trade 
agreements  with  third  parties.  The  European 
Commission  proposed  to  open  negotiations 
and made recommendations to the Council of 
Ministers.  The  latter  formally  authorized  the 
Commission  and  defined  the  negotiation 
directives. The Commission then conducted the 
negotiation  process  in  consultation  with  a 
special  committee  appointed  by  the  Council 
and composed of representatives of Member 
States.  Once the negotiations were concluded, 
the Council adopted a decision authorizing the 
signing  of  the  agreement.  In  cases  of  mixed 
agreements,  the  Member  States  also  had  to 
ratify  the  agreement.  There  was  no 
requirement  to  consult  with  the  European 
Parliament  before  the  conclusion  of  an 
international trade agreement. 
 
Following  successive  revisions  of  the  original 
EEC Treaty, the European Parliament's assent | Page 10 
has  been  required  for  the  conclusion  of  the 
most important trade agreements
5 : 
 
  When  these  required  changes  in  EC 
domestic  legislation  are  adopted  by  co-
decision by the Council and the EP;  
  When there were budgetary implications 
  When new institutional arrangements were 
established.  
 
The EP also has to give its assent to association 
agreements.  
 
In practice, and even in the absence of a legal 
obligation to do so, the European Commission 
informed  the  European  Parliament  about  its 
main  strategies  and  on  the  ongoing 
negotiations.
6 Unlike  the  Council,  however, 
that  could  give  ‘instructions’  to  the 
Commission  during  negotiations,  the  EP  was 
merely informed. 
 
Moreover,  for  political  rather  than  for  legal 
reasons, any major trade agreement has been 
presented  to  the  EP  for  its  assent.  Trade 
agreements  like  the  most  recently  concluded 
EU-South  Korea  FTA  would  have  been 
presented to the EP for its assent before the 
Lisbon Treaty.   
 
However,  the  Parliament's  approval  was  not 
required  for  the  adoption  of  negotiating 
mandates or for the routine conclusion of all 
trade agreements.  
 
Likewise,  the  European  Parliament  did  not 
have any power in the shaping and adoption of 
EU  legislation  defining  the  framework  for 
implementing the trade policy such as the anti-
dumping or the trade barrier regulation. These 
were adopted by the sole Council of Ministers. 
 
                                                      
5 Article 300 (3) subpar.2 EC Treaty 
6 This  is  included  in  the  Framework  Agreement  on 
relations between the Parliament and the Commission, 
Official Journal C 117 18 May 2006, p.21 
The  limited  role  of  the  European  Parliament 
raised  the  issue  of  the  democratic 
accountability  of  the  European  Common 
Commercial Policy. With the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has 
seen its role enhanced both in the negotiations 
and conclusion of trade agreements and in the 
adoption of internal trade legislation. 
 
The  increased  role  of  the  EP  after  the 
Lisbon Treaty 
 
The  Lisbon  Treaty  increases  the  role  of  the 
European Parliament in several ways. 
 
Where  agreements  with  one  or  more  third 
countries  or  international  organisations  need 
to  be  negotiated  and  concluded,  Article  207 
TFEU,  amending  former  Article  133  TEC, 
establishes that:  
 
“The  Commission  shall  make 
recommendations to the Council, which shall 
authorise  it  to  open  the  necessary 
negotiations. The Council and the Commission 
shall  be  responsible  for  ensuring  that  the 
agreements  negotiated  are  compatible  with 
internal Union policies and rules. 
 
The  Commission  shall  conduct  these 
negotiations  in  consultation  with  a  special 
committee appointed by the Council to assist 
the  Commission  in  this  task  and  within  the 
framework  of  such  directives  as  the  Council 
may issue to it. The Commission shall report 
regularly to the special committee and to the 
European  Parliament  on  the  progress  of 
negotiations.” 
 
If  it  is  still  the  Council  that  gives  the 
Commission  its  negotiating  mandate,  the 
Commission is to report both to a committee 
appointed by the Council and to the European 
Parliament  on  the  progress  of  negotiations. 
The Lisbon Treaty formalizes in that respect the 
current practice and gives it a legal basis. 
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In  addition,  the  consent  of  the  European 
Parliament is now required before the Council 
can  adopt  a  decision  concluding  a  certain 
number  of  agreements  as  defined  by  Article 
218(6) (a)(i) to (v) of the TFEU. In particular, the 
EP has to give its consent to agreements in the 
fields where the ordinary legislative procedure 
(hereafter the OLP) applies in the adoption of 
EU internal legislation. Since the OLP applies in 
the  Common  Commercial  Policy,  the  EP  will 
have to give its consent to all trade agreements. 
It  does  not  however  have  the  possibility  to 
propose amendments to the draft Treaty and 
can  only  approve  or  reject  the  whole 
agreement on a “take it or leave it basis”. 
 
This implies that the opinion of the EP will be 
essential in the conclusion of trade agreements. 
Even if formally speaking, it is still the Council 
that  gives  the  negotiating  mandate  to  the 
Commission,  the  opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament may have to be taken into account 
even before the initiation of any future trade 
negotiations. To avoid having the EP blocking 
the whole agreement at the conclusion stage, 
it will be necessary to ensure that the EP is well 
aware  of  the  content  of  the  agreement  and 
that its majority backs the whole content of the 
agreement. 
 
For  the  adoption  of  measures  defining  the 
framework  for  implementing  the  common 
commercial  policy,  the  Lisbon  Treaty 
establishes that all acts of legislative nature in 
the Common Commercial Policy will have to be 
adopted by the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, 
the  former  “co-decision  procedure”.  This 
means  that  in  the  future,  all  legislation  for 
implementing  the  CCP  -  with  the  notable 
exception of international agreements – will be 
co-decided  by  the  Council  and  the  EP.  This 
includes  for  example  all  the  regulations 
defining the EU trade defense instruments. 
 
Finally,  the  new  rules  for  regulating  the 
transfer  of  executive  powers  and  the 
comitology  mechanism  contained  in  Articles 
290  and  291  TFEU  give  the  EP  rights  with 
regard  to  the  supervision  of  measures  to  be 
adopted  by  the  Commission  for  the 
implementation  of  EU  legislation  when  the 
base  act  was  co-adopted  by  the  EP  and  the 
Council. The role of the EP in the supervision of 
measures  implementing  legislative  acts 
adopted in the CCP field will consequently also 
be enhanced. 
 
3)  A clarification of competences in the 
area of EU external trade policy 
 
The Lisbon Treaty explicitly places the Common 
Commercial  Policy  under  the  exclusive 
competence  of  the  Union  (Article  3  of  the 
Treaty of Lisbon) and extends the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy to all key aspects 
of external trade. This clarifies the system of 
competences  in  the  EU  external  trade  policy 
area  and  simplifies  the  procedure  for  the 
adoption  of  far-reaching  trade  agreements 
between the EU and its partners. This would be 
in  line  with  the  new  strategy  defined  in  the 
‘Global Europe’ communication
7, which aims at 
reinforcing  the  role  of  the  EU  in  the  bi-  and 
multilateral  negotiation  process  of  the  new 
generation  of  free  trade  agreements  and 
putting an end to the long disputed issue of the 
scope of the Common Commercial Policy.  
 
Trade  policy  competences  in  the  EU 
before the Lisbon Treaty 
 
Since the origins of the European Community 
in  1957,  the  Common  Commercial  Policy  has 
been  an  exclusive  European  ie  Community 
competence. This means that Member States 
are precluded from conducting individual trade 
policies. It is the institutions of the Community, 
and now of the Union, that are competent to 
adopt  EU  trade  legislation  and  enter  into 
bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.  
 
Since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  of  the  EEC 
Treaty  in  1958,  the  scope  of  the  Common 
                                                      
7 see footnote 1 | Page 12 
Commercial  Policy  has changed  several  times 
to adapt to the new realities of international 
trade and economic relations.
8 If the European 
Court of Justice has held since 1973 that the 
Common  Commercial  Policy  constitutes  an 
exclusive  competence  of the  Community,  the 
question  of  what  areas  are  covered  by  the 
Common  Commercial  Policy  has  been  the 
subject of many debates.  
 
Originally, at the time of the adoption of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, international trade law 
had a clear focus on goods, which explains that 
the EEC Treaty made explicit reference to trade 
in goods.  However, the Court  also held in its 
opinion  1/78  that  the  Common  Commercial 
Policy  should  be  interpreted  widely.  As  the 
areas  of  services,  trade  related  aspect  of 
intellectual  property  and  investment  gained 
importance  in  the  international  economy, 
debates  took  place  within  the  EU  as  to  the 
extension  of  the  scope  of  the  exclusive 
European, that is, Community competence to 
these areas.  
 
The  Court  pronounced  on  the  issue  in  its 
Opinion 1/94 and held that if trade in goods fell 
under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the 
Community, this was only partly the case for 
services and intellectual property issues.
9 This 
was to reflect the internal competence of the 
Community  in  the  areas  of  services  and 
intellectual  property  regulation.  As  a 
consequence, some services were EU and some 
Member State or mixed competence.  
 
The attempts made in the Nice and Amsterdam 
Treaties to clarify the situation only resulted in 
a partial extension of the scope of the Common 
Commercial Policy to some aspects of services 
                                                      
8  Bugenberg, p.1 
9 Roland Klages, Promoting EU Interest at Global Level, 
Chapter  8,  The  EU  Internal  Market  in  Comparative 
Perspective,  Economic,  Political  and  Legal  Analyses, 
Cahiers  du  Collège  d'Europe  /  College  of  Europe 
Studies  Vol. 9, 2008, p.213 
and  trade  related  aspects  of  intellectual 
property.  
 
The  result  was  an  “unreadable  unsystematic 
and  complex  system  of  competence  rules”.
10 
Trade  in  goods  was  an  exclusive  European 
competence.  Some  services  and  some  trade 
related  intellectual  property  rights  fell  under 
the  European  competence,  some  others  fell 
under the shared competences of the EU and 
the  Member  States.  In  practice,  “this  meant 
that agreements containing provision on trade 
in goods and services or intellectual property 
aspects falling out the European consequence 
had to be so-called “mixed agreements” that 
required the ratification by both EU institutions 
(i.e. the Council) and the national parliaments. 
This meant that any national parliament of a 
Member  State  discontent  with the provisions 
of a chapter could veto the agreement in its 
entirety”.
11 
 
In addition, investment was an area of mixed 
competence.  Member  States  have  concluded 
around  one?  thousand  Bilateral  Investment 
Treaties  (BITs)  with  a  view  to  promote  and 
protect  investment  flows,  leading  to  the 
creation  of  the  so-called  ‘spaghetti-bowl 
effect’.
12 The EU institutions have pursued the 
liberalization  of  FDI  based  on  the  so-called 
“Minimum Platform on Investment” which was 
adopted by the EU Council of Ministers in 2006. 
The  EU  has  so  far  negotiated  agreements 
covering  market  access  for  investment  in 
services
13  but  no  general  investment 
liberalization. 
 
Finally,  transport  does  not  fall  within  trade 
policy  and  any  trade  agreement  containing 
provisions  applying  to  the  transport  area 
requires  mixed  agreements.  This  remains the 
case with the entry in to force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
                                                      
10 Bungenberg, p.7 
11 Bungenberg, p.7 
12 Bungenberg, p.10 
13 Such as in mode 3 of the GATS | Page 13 
 
The  EU  trade  policy  system  of 
competences in the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The Lisbon Treaty clarifies the EU competence 
for services and extends the EU competence to 
the  area  of  Foreign  Direct  Investments.  As  a 
result,  all  key  aspects  of  trade,  goods  and 
services,  commercial  aspects  of  intellectual 
property  and  foreign  direct  investment  fall 
under  the  exclusive  competence  of  the 
European Union.
14 
 
In  the  area  of  services,  this  means  that  the 
existing  carve-out  (special  provisions)  for 
culture or health no longer exists  and that the 
EU  is  competent  for  trade  in  all  services. 
However, the sensitivity of the areas of trade in 
audio-visual,  health,  education  and  social 
services is reflected in the voting rules in the 
Council of Ministers.  
 
If  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  further  extends  the 
scope of application of the Qualified Majority 
Voting  (QMV)  and  provides  for  qualified 
majority voting for all aspects of trade policy, it 
provides for a limited number of exceptions in 
sensitive services areas. 
 
Article  207(4)  of  the  TFEU  provides  for 
unanimity in the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements of culture and audio visual services, 
where these agreements “risk prejudicing the 
Union’s linguistic and cultural diversity”. These 
agreements will be negotiated and concluded 
by the Union institutions alone but will have to 
be adopted unanimously in exceptional cases. 
 
Likewise,  unanimity  is  required  for  the 
adoption of agreements in the field of trade in 
social,  education  and  health  services,  where 
these agreements “risk seriously disturbing the 
national  organization  of  such  services  and 
prejudicing the responsibility of Member States 
to  deliver  them”.  If  unanimity  may  still  be 
                                                      
14 Article 207(1) TFEU 
required  in  exceptional  circumstances,  these 
areas  are  no  longer  mixed  competences  but 
the exclusive competence of the Union. 
 
More  generally,  Article  207(4)  provides  that 
“for  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of 
agreements  in  the  fields  of  trade  in  services 
and  the  commercial  aspects  of  intellectual 
property, as well as foreign direct investment, 
the Council shall act unanimously where such 
agreements  include  provisions  for  which 
unanimity  is  required  for  the  adoption  of 
internal  rules”  in  line  with  the  so-called 
principle of parallelism of competences. 
 
The major innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is to 
give  the  EU  an  exclusive  competence  on 
foreign  direct  investment.  The  Lisbon  Treaty 
includes foreign direct investment in the scope 
of  the  Common  Commercial  Policy  and  does 
not provide for any exception. This means that 
the EU would have the exclusive competence 
to  negotiate  Bilateral  Investment  Treaties  in 
almost all sectors.  
 
The  question  however  arises  as  to  the 
definition  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment  as 
many argue that it is not clear whether FDI as 
mentioned  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty  includes 
investment  protection  and  investment 
promotion  alongside  investment 
liberalization.
15  The  European  Commission 
recognizes that there is no clear full definition 
of  FDI.  In  their  view,  however,  the  EU 
competence  on  FDI  includes  investment 
protection.  It  considers  however  that  it  does 
not cover portfolio investment.
16  
 
 
Implications of Changes in the CCP for the 
EU trading partners  
 
                                                      
15 See Bugenberg, p.11 and Woolcock, p. 4 
16 Report  of  the  DG  Trade  Civil  Society  Meeting,  The 
impact of the Lisbon Treaty on trade policy, 27 January 
2010, p.3 | Page 14 
What will be the implications of the changes 
introduced  by  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  on  the 
conduct of the Common Commercial Policy and 
in  particular  on  the  trade  relations  between 
the EU and its trading partners? 
 
1)  Impact of the integration/insertion  of 
the CCP into a broader context 
 
Until the Lisbon treaty, “the EU had not taken 
full account of aims and principles outside the 
economics of trade policy”.
17 The new articles 
introduced in the Lisbon Treaty make clear that 
the EU not only has a liberalization agenda, but 
that  other  objectives  -  human  rights,  good 
governance,  environmental  protection, 
sustainable development – must be taken into 
account in formulating trade policy within the 
WTO as well as in the negotiation of bilateral 
trade  and  investment  agreements.
18 It  also 
makes  explicit  what  is  already  the  case:  that 
trade  policy  can  be  used  in  order  to  attain 
other non-economic objectives, and that links 
can  be  made  between  trade  policy  and  the 
Union’s  principles  and  values.  The  Lisbon 
Treaty  may therefore  provide  a basis  for  the 
use of conditionality in trade policy.
19  
 
 
While  trade agreements were sometimes used 
to  pursue  both  economic  and  political 
objectives  as  in  the  case  of  the  Europe 
Agreements with Central and Eastern European 
Countries in the mid-nineties, the decision to 
enter  into  a  trade  agreement  with  a  third 
country  outside  of  Europe  has  usually  been 
motivated by economic reasons. In addition, as 
spelled out in the Global Europe strategy
20, “in 
the global economy, Europe’s trade policy must 
become an integral part of its wider approach 
                                                      
17 Bungenberg, p.15 
18 Bungenberg p. 14 
19 Marise  Cremona, A Constitutional Basis for Effective 
External Action? An assessment of the Provisions on EU 
External Action in the Constitutional Treaty, EUI Working 
Papers, Law no. 2006/30, p.30 
20 See footnote 2 
to economic reform and competitiveness”. In 
particular,  the  strategy  proposes  a  new 
programme of bilateral free trade agreements 
with key partners in which economic – and not 
political - criteria are a primary consideration.  
 
In  that  context,  it  will  be  interesting  to  see 
what role the High Representative will play in 
“shaping the balance between trade and other 
objectives. Much may depend on its relations 
between  both  the  Commission  and  the 
Council”.
21 More generally, some uncertainties 
remain as to how the key players involved  – 
the Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht, the 
New  High  Representative,  Catherine  Ashton, 
the Member State chairing the EU presidency 
but also the new EU president - will interact. It 
seems  that  the  changes  introduced  by  the 
Lisbon  Treaty  may  lead  to  more  people 
speaking in the area of trade policy. 
 
It is however likely that in the short to medium 
term at least, the Commission will continue to 
shape  the  nature  and  content  of  trade 
agreements as it has the technical capacity.
22 
 
2)  Impact of increased role of European 
Parliament 
 
The enhanced role of the EP in the CCP will also 
increase  the  possibility  of  non-economic 
objectives  such  as  human  rights  issues  or 
environmental  and  social  standards  being 
taken  into  account.  We  have  seen  how  the 
Lisbon Treaty enables the European Parliament 
to play a full part in trade policy development 
and  treaty-making.  If  some  of  the  novelties 
introduced  by  the  Lisbon  Treaty  are  a 
codification  of  existing  practices,  the  Lisbon 
Treaty allows the EP to fully participate in the 
conduct  of  the  Common  Commercial  Policy, 
both in the area of trade agreements and as a 
co-legislator  for  the  adoption  of  trade 
implementing measures.  
 
                                                      
21 Woolcock, p. 3 
22 Woolcock, p.3 | Page 15 
If, in the past, a lack of legal power and the 
limited ability to provide close scrutiny of the 
EC’s negotiating position has meant that the EP 
veto power to an agreement already accepted 
by the MS and the EC negotiating partners may 
not have been credible, the new rights given to 
the EP may impact the conduct of the EU trade 
policy. 
 
In  giving  more  powers  to  the  EP,  the  Lisbon 
Treaty increases the democratic accountability 
of  EU  trade  policy.  This  will  also  give  more 
importance  to  the  political  dimension  of  any 
future  trade  negotiations
23  as  the  EP  is 
expected  to  exercise  a  more  active  and 
effective  scrutiny  of  trade  negotiations.  This 
will need to be well taken into account by all 
acts  involved  as  the  EP  is  now  to  give  its 
consent to all trade agreement on a “take it or 
leave it” basis. 
 
The increased role of the European Parliament 
may lead to a “politicization” of the Common 
Commercial Policy and the use of conditionality 
in trade policy may be reinforced
24. 
 
In  practice,  new  inter-institutional 
arrangements  will  need  to  be  worked  out  to 
reflect the fact that both the Council and the 
EP will have to give instructions and control to 
the  Commission  during  the  negotiations  of 
trade  agreements.  More  generally, 
arrangements will need to be defined in order 
to  solve  possible  conflicts  between  the 
positions of the Council and of the Parliament. 
The participation of more actors in the conduct 
of the EU trade policy may also lead to longer 
lead-in times
25. 
 
                                                      
23 Report  of  the  DG  Trade  Civil  Society  Meeting,  The 
impact of the Lisbon Treaty on trade policy, 27 January 
2010, p. 2 
24 Bungenberg, p.15 
25 Report  of  the  DG  Trade  Civil  Society  Meeting,  The 
impact of the Lisbon Treaty on trade policy, 27 January 
2010, p. 2 
 
These new rules for the conduct apply since 1 
December  2009,  even  if  the  practical 
arrangements still need to be defined and put 
in  place.  As  a  consequence,  all  trade 
agreements will now need to get the consent 
of  the  European  Parliament  including  all 
pending multilateral and bilateral agreements 
that are currently being negotiated. 
 
EU trading partners will need to watch more 
closely  the  EP  when  dealing  with  the  EU  on 
trade  policy.  In  that  respect,  it  will  be 
interesting to follow the EP discussions on the 
recently agreed EU/South Korea FTA that will 
now be presented to the EP for its consent. 
 
3)  Impact of the extension of scope of EU 
CCP 
 
The clarification of the scope of the CCP and 
the  fact  that  all  aspects  of  the  CCP  now  fall 
under the exclusive competence of the EU are 
expected to contribute to a streamlining of the 
trade policy conduct and a coherence of the EU 
trade policy. 
 
The first consequence is that the extension of 
the scope of exclusive competences in the CCP 
will  reduce  significantly  the  need  of  further 
mixed agreements. There will no longer  be any 
mixed  trade  agreements  –  only  EU  ones.  
However,  in  cases  where  agreements  cover 
policies outside the scope of the CCP with no 
exclusive competence, Member States will still 
be required to ratify the agreement. The new 
generation  of  EU  free  trade  agreements  that 
will  be  concluded  with  India,  Singapore  and 
Mercosur,  for  example,  will  be  mixed 
agreements due to their complexity and wide 
range of policies covered.  
 
The  fact  that  FDI  is  now  an  exclusive 
competence  of  the  EU  will  also  have  several 
other consequences. 
 
Member  States  will  no  longer  be  able  to 
conclude BITs unless they are empowered by | Page 16 
the  EU  to  continue  or  conclude  such 
agreements.
26 The opportunity and the form of 
such an empowerment will need to be worked 
out  between  the  EU  institutions  and  the 
Member States. 
 
A further issue is the impact of such a change 
on existing BITs concluded by Member States. 
According to Article 351 TFEU and Article 4(3) 
TEU, Member states will be obliged to adapt 
their BITs to EU law. Since the Lisbon Treaty 
does not foresee any transitional period or any 
provision  recognizing  the  right  of  Member 
States  to  keep  in  place  their  existing 
agreements as long as they are fully compliant 
with  EU  law,  the  existing  BITs  concluded  by 
Member States may have to be denunciated. 
 
For  the  sake  of  legal  certainty,  however,  a 
“grandfathering  solution”  is  likely  to  be 
adopted in the short term. This means that an 
exemption  might  be  granted  that  would 
exceptionally allow the existing BITs to be kept 
in  place  until  the  adoption  of  EU  investment 
agreements.  The  exact  conditions  of  such  a 
clause  will  have  to  be  discussed  among  the 
different parties involved. 
 
This situation will however have to be clarified 
by the EU both for existing BITs and for BITs 
under  negotiation  as  the  EU  trading partners 
are also questioning why they should continue 
with  or  negotiate  a  series  of  individual 
investment agreements with Member States
27. 
 
More  generally,  the  inclusion  of  FDI  in  EU 
competence  may  lead  to  the  creation  of  a 
comprehensive  EU  approach  to  trade  and 
investment  that  reflects  the  nature  of  the 
international  economy  in  which  trade  and 
investment  are  inextricably  linked
28 .  The 
Commission already stressed the importance of 
                                                      
26 Article 218 TFEU 
27 Woolcock, p. 4 
28 Woolcock, p. 4 
investment in the EU bilateral negotiations as 
well as at the multilateral level
29. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is not yet clear what the extent of the impact 
of reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty will 
be. Opinions diverge as to whether in practice 
the changes proposed by the Lisbon Treaty in 
relation to the EU’s external trade agreements 
will  significantly  alter  the  status  quo  and 
second,  whether  the  proposed  changes  are 
sufficient to make the CCP more efficient and 
more democratic.  
 
Much  will  depend  on  the  implementation  of 
the newly introduced arrangements. However, 
at this stage we can say that the EU’s trading 
partners will have to look more broadly to the 
EU’s  trade  policy  as  an  integral  part  of  its 
overall external policy to the trading partner. 
This may mean that non-trade policy issues will 
more  easily  interfere  with  specific  trade 
agenda  issues.  Second,  the  EU’s  trading 
partners will have to watch more closely the EP 
when dealing with the EU on trade issues given 
the increased roles of the EP on trade policy. A 
lot will depend on the way the EP will exercise 
the  new  powers  granted  to  it  by  the  Lisbon 
Treaty.   
 
 
 
                                                      
29 Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2006) 1230, 
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